Finite-volume Hyperbolic 3-Manifolds contain immersed Quasi-Fuchsian surfaces

The paper contains a new proof that a complete, non-compact hyperbolic $3$-manifold $M$ with finite volume contains an immersed, closed, quasi-Fuchsian surface.Comment: Final version to appear in AGT. Some typos corrected, particularly def (3.6). Rewording of 4 paragraphs in proof of (4.2) for added clarity. Final section added comparing this paper to the approach of Masters and Zhan

Conservative Subgroup Separability For Surfaces With Boundary

If F is a surface with boundary, then a finitely generated subgroup without peripheral elements of G = {\pi}_1(F) can be separated from finitely many other elements of G by a finite index subgroup of G corresponding to a finite cover F' with the same number of boundary components as F

The spectra of the spherical and euclidean triangle groups

We derive the spectrum of the Laplace-Beltrami operator on the quotient orbifold of the non hyperbolic triangle groups.Comment: accepted in the Journal of the Australian Mathematical Societ

EFFECTS OF AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL PAYMENT POLICIES ON AGRICULTURAL TRADE

In many OECD countries, including the U.S., interest in developing agri-environmental payment programs is currently strong. In the future, the inclusion of an agri-environmental payment program into the WTO's "green box" could be more easily challenged by WTO member countries on the basis that it has more than "minimal" trade-distorting impacts on production. The goal of this paper is to conduct an ex ante analysis of the trade impacts of stylized examples of agri-environmental payment programs that have been proposed for implementation in the near future. To simulate the production and trade impacts of these programs, we use a partial equilibrium model of the U.S. agricultural sector in a sensitivity analysis across a range of design options for agri-environmental payments. For the three agri-environmental payment scenarios evaluated, the maximum change in exports ranges from a 7 percent decrease (wheat) to a 1 percent increase (soybeans). We do not expect the programs that decrease U.S. production, which would tend to have an upward pressure on world commodity prices, to be challenged before the WTO.Agricultural and Food Policy,

Tools for distributed application management

Distributed application management consists of monitoring and controlling an application as it executes in a distributed environment. It encompasses such activities as configuration, initialization, performance monitoring, resource scheduling, and failure response. The Meta system (a collection of tools for constructing distributed application management software) is described. Meta provides the mechanism, while the programmer specifies the policy for application management. The policy is manifested as a control program which is a soft real-time reactive program. The underlying application is instrumented with a variety of built-in and user-defined sensors and actuators. These define the interface between the control program and the application. The control program also has access to a database describing the structure of the application and the characteristics of its environment. Some of the more difficult problems for application management occur when preexisting, nondistributed programs are integrated into a distributed application for which they may not have been intended. Meta allows management functions to be retrofitted to such programs with a minimum of effort

Revoluciones semilegales en el Mediterráneo

Este artículo presenta un estudio de tres casos de revolución semilegal -Egipto, España y Alemania- acentuando particularmente el énfasis en las dos primeras por su carácter de revoluciones democratizadoras. Se define a la revolución semilegal dentro de un encuadre weberiano, constituyendo una analogía moderna del estudio realizado por Weber acerca de la rutinización del carisma. A través de un estudio comparativo de los tres casos se expone un modelo descriptivo que identifica las condiciones bajo las cuales tiene lugar la revolución semilegal, los factores que la sustentan, y la dinámica interna (o lógica) que parece impulsarla

Archive, Theater, Ship: The Phelps Sisters Film the World

Examines the archival survival of the amateur travelog films made by Eleanor and Claudia Lea Phelps from 1923 to 1930. Argues that early twenty-first century interest in these materials testifies to archives’ heterotopian properties, as described by Michel Foucault in his 1967 essay “Of Other Spaces.” It follows that the aim of archival work should not be to preserve or recover the past, but to transform present day institutions and their relationships. Scholars of “women and the silent screen” are engaged in precisely this kind of activity

The Proposed U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA): Provisions and Implications

[Excerpt] On June 30, 2007, U.S. and South Korean trade officials signed the proposed U.S.-South Korean Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) for their respective countries. If approved, the KORUS FTA would be the second-largest FTA that South Korea has signed to date, after the agreement with the European Union (EU). It would be the second-largest (next to North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA) in which the United States participates. South Korea is the seventhlargest trading partner of the United States and the United States is South Korea’s third-largest trading partner. Various studies conclude that the agreement would increase bilateral trade and investment flows. The final text of the proposed KORUS FTA covers a wide range of trade and investment issues and, therefore, could have substantial economic implications for both the United States and South Korea. The agreement will not enter into force unless Congress approves implementation legislation. The negotiations were conducted under the trade promotion authority (TPA), also called fast-track trade authority, that Congress granted the President under the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210). Under TPA the President has the discretion on when to submit the implementing legislation to Congress. President Bush did not submit the legislation because of differences with the Democratic leadership over treatment of autos and beef, among other issues. Early in his Administration, President Obama indicated the need to resolve those issues before he would submit the implementing legislation. On December 3, 2010, after a series of arduous negotiations and missed deadlines, President Obama and President Lee announced that their negotiators reached agreement on modifications in the KORUS FTA, and that they were prepared to move ahead to getting the agreement approved by the respective legislatures. The White House is expected to send implementing legislation to the 112th Congress and that it would like to see Congress approve the agreement by July 1 of this year. The modifications are in the form of changes in phase-out periods for tariffs on autos, a new safeguard provision on autos, and concessions by South Korea on allowing a larger number of U.S. cars into South Korea under U.S. safety standards than was the case under the original KORUS FTA provisions. The issue of full U.S. beef access was not resolved because of the political sensitivity of the issue in South Korea. In 2008, when President Lee reached a separate agreement with the United States to lift South Korea’s ban on U.S. beef imports, massive anti-South Korean government protests forced the two governments to renegotiate its terms. The U.S. beef sector has largely supported the KORUS FTA. A broad swath of the U.S. business community supports the KORUS FTA . With the modifications in the agreement reached in December, this group also includes the three Detroit-based auto manufacturers and the United Auto Workers (UAW) union. It still faces opposition from some labor unions and other groups, including Public Citizen. Many U.S. supporters view passage of the KORUS FTA as important to secure new opportunities in the South Korean market, while opponents claim that the KORUS FTA does not go far enough to break down South Korean trade barriers or that the agreement will encourage U.S. companies to move their production offshore at the expense of U.S. workers. Other observers have suggested the outcome of the KORUS FTA could have implications for the U.S.-South Korean alliance as a whole, as well as on U.S. Asia policy and U.S. trade policy, particularly in light of an FTA signed in by South Korea and the EU that is expected to go into effect on July 1, 2011

The EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement and Its Implications for the United States

[Excerpt] On October 6,2010, the 27 member European Union (EU) and South Korea signed a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA). The agreement is expected to go into effect on July 1, 2011, pending approval by the European Parliament and the South Korean National Assembly. If enacted, the South Korea-EU FTA (KOREU FTA) would be the largest FTA in terms of market size that South Korea has entered into. The KOREU FTA reflects the EU and South Korean trade strategies to use FTAs to strengthen economic ties outside their home regions. It also builds upon the surge in trade and investment flows between South Korea and the EU over the past decade. This agreement has possible implications for U.S. trade with South Korea and congressional action on the proposed U.S.-South Korea FTA (KORUS FTA). The proposed KOREU FTA is very comprehensive. It would reduce and eliminate tariffs and other trade barriers in manufactured goods, agricultural products and services and would also cover such trade-related activities as government procurement, intellectual property rights, labor rights and environmental issues. Most studies done on the potential impact of the KOREU FTA estimate that the agreement will have a small but positive effect on the economies of the EU and South Korea as a whole and that the larger relative impact would be on the South Korean economy. The greatest economic impact of the KOREU FTA would be on specific sectors in each economy. EU services providers would be expected to experience gains from the agreement, especially in the areas of retail and wholesale trade, transportation services, financial services, and business services. In terms of trade in goods, EU exporters of pharmaceuticals, auto parts, industrial machinery, electronics parts, and some agricultural goods and processed foods would be expected to gain from the KOREU FTA\u27s implementation. At the same time, South Korean manufacturers of cars, ships, wireless telecommunications devices, chemical products, and imaging equipment would be expected to increase their exports to the EU market. The KOREU FTA is similar to the proposed KORUS FTA in many respects. Both agreements are comprehensive and both would eliminate tariffs on most trade in goods soon after they enter into force. However, they differ in other respects. Phase-out periods for tariffs on some manufactured goods differ. In addition, the KOREU FTA does not cover foreign direct investment. Unlike the KORUS FTA, the KOREU FTA would not allow trade sanctions to be applied where violations of the workers\u27 rights, and environment provisions have been deemed to occur. In addition, the KORUS FTA would cover a broader range of trade in services than would the KOREU FTA. It is not clear whether these differences in the structures of the FTAs would result in appreciable differences in outcomes in terms of economic gains and losses. U.S. and European firms are close competitors in a number of sectors and industries, particularly autos. Some business representatives argue that enactment of the KOREU FTA before enactment of the KORUS FTA would give European competitors commercial first mover advantages, since EU firms, such as those in the auto industry or the services sector, could gain greater market opportunities in South Korea not afforded to US. firms. On the other hand, other factors could also mitigate such advantages. For example, U.S. multinational firms operating in the EU could benefit from the KOREU FTA. Nevertheless, the content and fate of the KOREU FTA could influence the pace and tone of any debate in the United States on the KORUS FTA in the 112th Congress